Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and rommate markets by Can, B. & Klaus, B.
Soc Choice Welf (2013) 41:835–862
DOI 10.1007/s00355-012-0708-9
ORIGINAL PAPER
Consistency and population sensitivity properties
in marriage and roommate markets
Burak Can · Bettina Klaus
Received: 7 June 2012 / Accepted: 16 October 2012 / Published online: 29 November 2012
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
Abstract We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be
matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are
consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172–186,
2011) introduced two new “population sensitivity” properties that capture the effect
newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitiv-
ity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate
markets, solvable roommate markets), we characterize the core using either of the pop-
ulation sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the
domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
1 Introduction
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched
as pairs or remain single. These markets are known as roommate markets and they
include, as special cases, the well-known marriage markets (Gale and Shapley 1962;
Roth and Sotomayor 1990). Furthermore, a roommate market is a simple example of
hedonic coalition as well as network formation: in a “roommate coalition” situation,
only coalitions of size one or two can be formed and in a “roommate network” sit-
uation, each agent is allowed or able to form only one link (for surveys and current
B. Can
Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
e-mail: b.can@maastrichtuniversity.nl
B. Klaus (B)
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef 538, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
e-mail: bettina.klaus@unil.ch
123
836 B. Can, B. Klaus
research of coalition and network formation see Demange and Wooders 2004; Jackson
2008).
In these markets the commodities to be traded are the agents themselves and agents
are consumers and resources at the same time. Two new “population sensitivity” prop-
erties, introduced in Klaus (2011), that capture the effect newcomers have on incum-
bent agents are competition and resource sensitivity: competition sensitivity requires
that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused because newcomers ini-
tiate new trades and resource sensitivity requires that some incumbents will benefit
if the extra resources are consumed. The corresponding weak population sensitivity
properties only consider situations when newcomers join one by one.
Both population sensitivity properties are closely related to population monotonic-
ity, a solidarity property that requires that additional agents affect the incumbents in a
similar way (either all incumbents are weakly better off or all incumbents are weakly
worse off). Because of the polarization of interests that occurs in marriage markets,
two specific versions of population monotonicity exist: own-side and other-side pop-
ulation monotonicity (Toda 2006, introduced the first and Klaus 2011, the second
of these specifications).1 Klaus (2011) shows that in marriage markets, essentially
own-side population monotonicity implies weak competition sensitivity and other-
side population monotonicity implies weak resource sensitivity. Furthermore, Klaus
(2011) presents the first characterizations of the core for solvable roommate mar-
kets using weak unanimity,2 Maskin monotonicity,3 and either weak competition or
weak resource sensitivity for marriage markets and solvable roommate markets and
two associated impossibility results on the domain of all roommate markets. These
characterizations can be seen as corresponding results for roommate markets to one
of Toda’s (2006, Theorem 3.1) core characterizations for marriage markets by weak
unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and own-side population monotonicity.
In a second characterization of the core for marriage markets, Toda’s (2006, The-
orem 3.2) uses consistency4 instead of Maskin monotonicity. In this paper, we show
how Toda’s “consistency results” can be extended to roommate markets. As main
results, we obtain new characterizations of the core on the domains of marriage mar-
kets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, and solvable roommate markets: on any of
these domains, a solution ϕ satisfies weak unanimity, consistency, and either of the
population sensitivity properties if and only if it equals the core (Theorems 3 and 4).
Two associated impossibility results on the domain of all roommate markets are also
established (Lemmas 6(d) and 7(d)). Our results imply two corresponding “population
monotonicity” results for marriage markets (Corollary 1): a solution ϕ satisfies weak
1 Own-side population monotonicity: if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incumbent men
(women) are weakly worse off.
Other-side population monotonicity: if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incumbent
women (men) are weakly better off.
2 Weak unanimity: if a complete unanimously best matching exists, then it is chosen.
3 Maskin monotonicity: if a matching is chosen in one market, then it is also chosen in a market that
results from a Maskin monotonic transformation (which essentially means that the matching improved in
the ranking of all agents).
4 Consistency: if a set of matched agents leaves, then the solution should still match the remaining agents
as before.
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unanimity, consistency, and either own-side or other-side population monotonicity if
and only if it equals the core (the characterization using own-side population monoto-
nicity is the one obtained by Toda’s (2006, Theorem 3.2)). Apart from establishing new
core characterizations for marriage and roommate markets (as well as some impos-
sibilities), we obtain new insights into the working of one-sided-markets: to extend
Toda’s (2006, Theorem 3.2) core characterization from marriage to roommate mar-
kets, we not only had to use one of the new population sensitivity properties, we also
had to develop a new proof strategy because the original two-sided market proof could
not be adapted (Example 1 shows this). Another aspect of our results is the validation
of population sensitivity properties as fundamental core properties. We discuss these
issues in more detail in our conclusion (Sect. 5).
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the roommate model and
basic properties of solutions. In Sect. 3, we introduce the variable population properties
consistency, (weak) competition sensitivity, and (weak) resource sensitivity. Section 4
contains the main results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the importance of our
results for the study of one-sided markets.
2 Roommate markets
2.1 The model
We consider Gale and Shapley’s (1962, Example 3) roommate markets with variable
sets of agents, e.g., because the allocation of dormitory rooms at a university occurs
every year for different sets of students.
Let N be the set of potential agents.5 For a non-empty finite subset N  N, L(N )
denotes the set of all linear orders over N .6 For i ∈ N , we interpret Ri ∈ L(N ) as
agent i’s strict preferences over sharing a room with any of the agents in N \ {i} and
having a room for himself (or consuming his best outside option); e.g., j Pi k Pi i Pi l
means that i would first like to share a room with j , then with k, and then i would
prefer to stay alone rather than sharing the room with l. If j Pi i , then agent i finds agent
j acceptable and if i Pi j , then agent i finds agent j unacceptable. RN = ∏N L(N )
denotes the set of all preference profiles of agents in N (over agents in N ). A roommate
market consists of a finite set of agents N  N and their preferences R ∈ RN and
is denoted by (N , R). A marriage market (Gale and Shapley 1962) is a roommate
market (N , R) such that N is the union of two disjoint sets M and W and each agent
in M (respectively W ) prefers being single to being matched with any other agent in
M (respectively W ).
A matching μ for roommate market (N , R) is a function μ : N → N of order two,
i.e., for all i ∈ N , μ(μ(i)) = i . Thus, at any matching μ, the set of agents is partitioned
5 Most results remain valid for a finite set of potential agents. We will explain throughout the article, which
results depend on the set of potential agents to be infinite.
6 A linear order over N is a binary relation R¯ that satisfies antisymmetry (for all i, j ∈ N , if i R¯ j and
j R¯ i , then i = j), transitivity (for all i, j, k ∈ N , if i R¯ j and j R¯ k, then i R¯ k), and comparability (for all
i, j ∈ N , i R¯ j or j R¯ i). By P¯ we denote the asymmetric part of R¯. Hence, given i, j ∈ N , i P¯ j means
that i is strictly preferred to j ; i R¯ j means that i P¯ j or i = j and that i is weakly preferred to j .
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into pairs of agents who share a room and singletons (agents who do not share a room).
Agent μ(i) is agent i’s match and if μ(i) = i then i is matched to himself or single.
For notational convenience, we often denote a matching in terms of the induced par-
tition, e.g., for N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and matching μ such that μ(1) = 2, μ(3) = 3 and
μ(4) = 5 we write μ = {(1, 2), 3, (4, 5)}. For S ⊆ N , we denote by μ(S) the set of
agents that are matched to agents in S, i.e., μ(S) = {i ∈ N | μ−1(i) ∈ S}. We denote
the set of all matchings for roommate market (N , R) by M(N , R) (even though this
set does not depend on preferences R). If it is clear which roommate market (N , R)
we refer to, matchings are assumed to be elements of M(N , R). Since agents only
care about their own matches, we use the same notation for preferences over agents
and matchings: for all agents i ∈ N and matchings μ,μ′, μ Ri μ′ if and only if
μ(i) Ri μ′(i).
Given a roommate market (N , R) and N ′ ⊆ N , we define the reduced preferences
R′ ∈ RN ′ of R to N ′ as follows:
(i) for all i ∈ N ′, R′i ∈ L(N ′) and
(ii) for all j, k, l ∈ N ′, j R′l k if and only if j Rl k.
We also denote the reduced preferences of R to N ′ by RN ′ .
Given a roommate market (N , R), a matchingμ ∈ M(N , R), and N ′ ⊆ N such that
μ(N ′) = N ′, the reduced (roommate) market of (N , R) at μ to N ′ equals (N ′, RN ′).
Given a roommate market (N , R), a matching μ ∈ M(N , R), and N ′ ⊆ N such
that μ(N ′) = N ′, we define the reduced matching μ′ of μ to N ′ as follows:
(i) μ′ : N ′ → N ′ and
(ii) for all i ∈ N ′, μ′(i) = μ(i).
We also denote the reduced matching of μ to N ′ by μN ′ . Note that μN ′ ∈
M(N ′, RN ′).
In the sequel, we consider various domains of roommate problems: the domain of
all roommate markets D, the domain of marriage markets DM , and later the domains
of solvable and of no-odd-rings roommate markets. To avoid notational complexity
when introducing solutions and their properties, we use the domain of all roommate
markets D with the understanding that any other domain could be used as well.
A solution ϕ on D is a correspondence that associates with each roommate market
(N , R) ∈ D a nonempty subset of matchings, i.e., for all (N , R) ∈ D, ϕ(N , R) ⊆
M(N , R) and ϕ(N , R) = ∅. A subsolution ψ of ϕ on D is a correspondence that
associates with each roommate market (N , R) ∈ D a nonempty subset of matchings
in ϕ(N , R), i.e., for all roommate markets (N , R) ∈ D, ψ(N , R) ⊆ ϕ(N , R) and
ψ(N , R) = ∅. A proper subsolution ψ of ϕ on D is a subsolution of ϕ on D such that
ψ = ϕ.
2.2 Basic properties and the core
We first introduce a voluntary participation condition based on the idea that no agent
can be forced to share a room.
Individual Rationality: Let (N , R) ∈ D and μ ∈ M(N , R). Then, μ is individ-
ually rational if for all i ∈ N , μ(i) Ri i . I R(N , R) denotes the set of all these
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matchings. A solution ϕ on D is individually rational if it only assigns individually
rational matchings, i.e., for all (N , R) ∈ D, ϕ(N , R) ⊆ I R(N , R).
Remark 1 (Individual Rationality and (Classical) Marriage Markets)
An individually rational matching for a marriage market (N , R) ∈ DM respects the
partition of agents into two types and never matches two men or two women. Hence,
we embed marriage markets into our roommate market framework by an assumption
on preferences (same gender agents are unacceptable) and individual rationality to
ensure that no two agents of the same gender are matched. We refer to a marriage
market for which matching agents of the same gender is simply assumed to not be
feasible as a classical marriage market. unionsq
Next, we introduce the well-known condition of Pareto optimality and the weaker
conditions of unanimity and weak unanimity.
Pareto Optimality: Let (N , R) ∈ D and μ ∈ M(N , R). Then, μ is Pareto optimal if
there is no other matching μ′ ∈ M(N , R) such that for all i ∈ N , μ′ Ri μ and for some
j ∈ N , μ′ Pj μ. P O(N , R) denotes the set of all these matchings. A solution ϕ on D
is Pareto optimal if it only assigns Pareto optimal matchings, i.e., for all (N , R) ∈ D,
ϕ(N , R) ⊆ P O(N , R).
(Weak) Unanimity: Let (N , R) ∈ D and μ ∈ M(N , R) be such that for all i, j ∈ N ,
μ(i) Ri j . Then, μ is the unanimously best matching for (N , R). If μ is complete,7
then, μ is the unanimously best complete matching for (N , R). A solution ϕ on D is
unanimous if it assigns the unanimously best matching whenever it exists, i.e., for all
roommate markets (N , R) ∈ D with a unanimously best matching μ, ϕ(N , R) = {μ}.
A solution ϕ on D is weakly unanimous if it assigns the unanimously best complete
matching whenever it exists, i.e., for all roommate markets (N , R) ∈ D with a unan-
imously best complete matching μ, ϕ(N , R) = {μ}.
Pareto optimality implies unanimity and unanimity implies weak unanimity.
The next property requires that two agents who are “mutually best agents” are
always matched with each other.
Mutually Best: Let (N , R) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] such that for all k ∈ N ,
i R j k and j Ri k. Then, i and j are mutually best agents for (N , R). A matching is a
mutually best matching if all mutually best agents are mutually matched. M B(N , R)
denotes the set of all these matchings. A solution ϕ on D is mutually best if it only
assigns matchings at which all mutually best agents are matched, i.e., for all roommate
markets (N , R) ∈ D, ϕ(N , R) ⊆ M B(N , R).
Our notion of mutually best is slightly stronger than that used in Toda’s (2006)
(because he considers mutually best man-woman pairs, he does not allow for a single
mutually best agent i = j). Furthermore, mutually best implies (weak) unanimity,
and Pareto optimality and mutually best are logically unrelated.
7 A matching is complete if it partitions the set of agents into pairs, i.e., it contains no singletons.
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The above properties can also be used to define solutions, the most prominent one
being the Pareto solution P O that assign to each roommate market the set of Pareto
optimal matchings.
Next, we define stability for roommate markets. A matching μ for roommate market
(N , R) ∈ D is blocked by a pair {i, j} ⊆ N [possibly i = j] if j Pi μ(i) and i Pj μ( j).
If {i, j} blocks μ, then {i, j} is called a blocking pair for μ. Hence, a matching μ for
roommate market (N , R) ∈ D is individually rational if there is no blocking pair {i, j}
with i = j for μ.
Stability, Solvability, and the Domain of Solvable Roommate Markets: Let
(N , R) ∈ D and μ ∈ M(N , R). Then, μ is stable if there is no blocking pair for
μ. S(N , R) denotes the set of all these matchings. A roommate market is solvable if
stable matchings exist, i.e., (N , R) is solvable if and only if the set of stable matchings
S(N , R) = ∅. The domain of solvable roommate markets is denoted by DS . Further-
more, on the domain of solvable roommate markets DS , a solution ϕ is stable if it
only assigns stable matchings, i.e., for all (N , R) ∈ DS , ϕ(N , R) ⊆ S(N , R).
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that all marriage markets are solvable, i.e.,
DM ⊆ DS , and they gave an example of an unsolvable roommate market (Gale
and Shapley 1962, Example 3).
For many of our results we need the solvability of roommate markets and their
reduced markets (Remark 3 in Sect. 3.1 explains the reason for this assumption); e.g.,
the domain of marriage markets is such a domain of roommate markets because it
is closed with respect to the reduction operator, i.e., starting from a marriage market
(N , R) ∈ DM , any reduced market (N ′, RN ′) of (N , R) is a marriage market.
Chung (2000) introduced a sufficient condition for solvability that also applies to
the larger domain of weak preferences. We formulate his well-known no-odd-rings
condition for our strict preference setup and refer to it as the no-odd-rings condition.8
Odd Rings and the Domain of No Odd Rings Roommate Markets: Let (N , R)∈D.
Then, a ring for roommate market (N , R) is an ordered subset of agents {i1, i2, . . . , ik}
⊆ N , k ≥ 3, such that for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, it+1 Pit it−1 Pit it (subscript modulo
k). If k is odd, then {i1, i2, . . . , ik} is an odd ring for roommate market (N , R). A
roommate market (N , R) ∈ D is a no-odd-rings roommate market if there exists no
odd ring for roommate market (N , R). The domain of all such roommate markets is
called the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets and denoted by DN O R . Note
that DM  DN O R  DS .
Another well-known concept for matching problems is the core.
Core: A matching is in the (strict or strong) core if no coalition of agents can
improve their welfare by rematching among themselves. For roommate market
(N , R) ∈ D, core(N , R) = {μ ∈ M(N , R) | there exists no S ⊆ N and no μ′ ∈
8 Among the no-odd-rings domains listed by Chung (2000) are the Beckerian domain, single-peaked
domains, single-dipped domains, and preference domains that are based on agents’ representability in a
metric space with the assumption that any agent prefers a match that is closer to a match that is further
away.
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M(N , R) such that μ′(S) = S, for all i ∈ S, μ′(i) Ri μ(i), and for some j ∈ S,
μ′( j) Pj μ( j)}.
Remark 2 (Stability and the Core)
Similarly as in other matching models (e.g., marriage markets and college admis-
sions markets), the core equals the set of stable matchings, i.e., for all (N , R) ∈ D,
core(N , R) = S(N , R). Hence, the core is a solution on the domain of solvable
roommate markets DS and all its subdomains, but not on the domain of all roommate
markets D. unionsq
It is well-known that the core satisfies all properties introduced in this
subsection.
Proposition 1 On the domain of solvable roommate markets (and on any of its subdo-
mains), the core satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality, (weak) unanimity,
mutually best, and stability.
3 Variable population properties
In this section we introduce and analyze properties that concern population changes.
3.1 Consistency
Consistency is one of the key properties in many frameworks with variable sets of
agents. Thomson (2009) provides an extensive survey of consistency for various eco-
nomic models, including marriage markets. For roommate markets, consistency essen-
tially requires that when a set of matched agents leaves, then the solution should still
match the remaining agents as before.
Consistency: A solution ϕ on D is consistent if the following holds. For each
(N , R) ∈ D, each N ′ ⊆ N , and each μ ∈ ϕ(N , R), if (N ′, RN ′) ∈ D is a reduced
market of (N , R) at μ to N ′ (i.e., μ(N ′) = N ′), then μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′).
For solutions defined on D′ ⊆ D, consistency only applies to reduced markets
(N ′, RN ′) ∈ D′. Of the four domains (DM ,DN O R,DS,D) that we consider, only
three are closed with respect to the reduction operator, i.e., for D′ ∈ {DM ,DN O R,D},
if (N , R) ∈ D′, μ ∈ M(N , R), and (N ′, RN ′) is a reduced market of (N , R) at μ,
then (N ′, RN ′) ∈ D′. For the domain of solvable roommate markets DS , non-solvable
reduced markets exist and therefore consistency “looses some of its bite” (because it
makes no predictions whenever market reduction leads to unsolvable reduced markets).
Remark 3 (Solvability when Studying the Core and Domain Restrictions)
Since stable matchings need not exist for the general domain of all roommate mar-
kets, we have to restrict attention to subdomains of solvable roommate markets when
studying the core. Considering the whole domain of solvable roommate markets when
studying consistency is difficult because a solvable roommate market might well have
unsolvable reduced markets. Requiring that a solution only selects matchings that
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guarantee the solvability of all restricted markets, would already steer results force-
fully towards the core. However, two domains of roommate markets we consider, DM
and DN O R , satisfy “closedness and solvability under the reduction operation”, i.e.,
for any roommate market in D′ ∈ {DM ,DN O R}, all possible reduced markets are (i)
elements of the domain D′ and (ii) solvable. unionsq
Proposition 2 On the domain of solvable roommate markets (and on any of its sub-
domains), the core satisfies consistency.
Proof Let D′ be a (sub)domain of solvable roommate markets. Let (N , R) ∈ D′,
μ ∈ core(N , R) and assume that (N ′, RN ′) ∈ D′ is a reduced market of (N , R) at
μ to N ′. Thus, core(N ′, R′N ) = ∅.
Assume that the core is not consistent and μN ′ /∈ core(N ′, RN ′). Hence, there
exists a blocking pair {i, j} ⊆ N ′ for μN ′ , i.e., j Pi μN ′(i) and i Pj μN ′( j). However,
since μN ′(i) = μ(i) and μN ′( j) = μ( j), {i, j} ⊆ N is also a blocking pair for μ;
contradicting μ ∈ core(N , R). unionsq
Lemma 1
(a) On the domain of marriage markets (see also Toda’s 2006, Lemma 3.6),
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
no proper subsolution of the core satisfies consistency.
(d) On the domain of all roommate markets, no solution is a subsolution of the core
for solvable problems and satisfies consistency (Özkal-Sanver 2010, Proposi-
tion 4.3).
We prove Lemma 1(a), (b), and (c) in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
(d) On the domain of all roommate markets,
mutually best and consistency imply individual rationality.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on any of the domains D′ of Lemma 2 that satisfies mutually
best and consistency. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a roommate market
(N , R) ∈ D′, a matching μ ∈ ϕ(N , R), and an agent i ∈ N such that i Pi μ(i). Hence,
μ(i) = i .
Let N ′ = {i, μ(i)} and consider the reduced market (N ′, RN ′) ∈ D′ of μ to N ′. By
consistency, μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′). However, at (N ′, RN ′) agent i is mutually best with
himself and by mutually best, μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′); a contradiction. unionsq
Note that the proof of Lemma 2 does not contain any steps that are sensitive with
respect to domain restrictions (except that all two-agent restricted markets used in the
proof should be included in the subdomain that is considered).
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3.2 Population sensitivity properties
The following two population sensitivity properties were introduced and analyzed by
Klaus (2011).
Consider the change of a roommate market (N , R) when a finite set of agents or
newcomers Nˆ  N\N shows up. Then, the new set of agents is N ′ = N ∪ Nˆ and
(N ′, R′), R′ ∈ RN ′ , is an extension of (N , R) if R′N = R.
Adding a set of newcomers Nˆ might be a positive or a negative change for any of
the incumbents in N because it might mean
a negative change with more competition or
a positive change with more resources.
First, with competition sensitivity we formulate a property that captures the possi-
ble negative effect newcomers might have on some agents. Essentially, competition
sensitivity requires that if two incumbents are newly matched after a set of newcomers
arrived, then one of them suffers from the increased competition by the newcomers
and is worse off.
(Weak) Competition Sensitivity (Klaus 2011): A solution ϕ on D is competition
sensitive if the following holds. Let (N , R) ∈ D be a roommate market and assume
that (N ′, R′) ∈ D, N ′ = N ∪ Nˆ , is an extension of (N , R). Then, for all μ ∈ ϕ(N , R)
there exists μ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are newly
matched at μ′, at least one is worse off, i.e., if i, j ∈ N , μ(i) = j , and μ′(i) = j ,
then μ(i) P ′i μ′(i) or μ( j) P ′j μ′( j).9 A solution ϕ on D is weakly competition sensi-
tive if we require competition sensitivity only when adding one newcomer at a time,
i.e., Nˆ = {n}. Note that the competition sensitivity property defined in Klaus (2008,
Definition 9) equals our weak competition sensitivity.
Klaus (2011, Lemma 3′) shows that on the domains of marriage markets, solvable
roommate markets, and all roommate markets, weak unanimity and weak competition
sensitivity imply mutually best. We list these results below and add a corresponding
result for the subdomain of no-odd-rings roommate markets.
Lemma 3
(a) On the domain of marriage markets (Klaus 2011, Lemma 3′(a)),
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets (Klaus 2011, Lemma 3′(b)),
(d) On the domain of all roommate markets (Klaus 2011, Lemma 3′(c)),
weak unanimity and weak competition sensitivity imply mutually best.
The proof of Lemma 3(b) is very similar to the proof of Lemma 3(a) for marriage
markets because starting from a no-odd-rings market [marriage market] one can add
the newcomers in the proof such that the resulting markets are again no-odd-rings
markets [marriage markets].
9 Equivalently, if agents in Nˆ are leaving: for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are not mutually matched
at μ anymore, at least one is better off, i.e., if i, j ∈ N , μ′(i) = j , and μ(i) = j , then μ(i) Pi μ′(i) or
μ( j) Pj μ′( j).
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On the domain of marriage markets, Toda’s (2006, Lemma 3.1) proves that weak
unanimity and own-side population monotonicity imply mutually best. The proof of
Lemma 3 follows similar arguments as Toda’s (2006, Lemma 3.1) proof for the cor-
responding marriage market result.
Example 2 in Appendix A.2 illustrates why Lemma 3 might not hold if the set of
potential agents is finite.
Second, with resource sensitivity we formulate a property that captures the possible
positive effect newcomers might have on some agents. Essentially, resource sensitivity
requires that if two incumbents are unmatched after a set of newcomers arrived, then
one of them benefits from the increase of resources by the newcomers and is better off
(Weak) Resource Sensitivity (Klaus 2011): A solution ϕ on D is resource sensi-
tive if the following holds. Let (N , R) ∈ D be a roommate market and assume that
(N ′, R′) ∈ D, N ′ = N ∪ Nˆ , is an extension of (N , R). Then, for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′)
there exists μ ∈ ϕ(N , R) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are not
mutually matched at μ′ anymore, at least one is better off, i.e., if i, j ∈ N , μ(i) = j ,
and μ′(i) = j , then μ′(i) P ′i μ(i) or μ′( j) P ′j μ( j).10 A solution ϕ on D is weakly
resource sensitive if we require resource sensitivity only when adding one newcomer
at a time, i.e., Nˆ = {n}. Note that the resource sensitivity property defined in Klaus
(2008, Definition 11) equals our weak resource sensitivity.
Klaus (2011, Lemma 4′(a) and (c)) shows that on the domains of marriage markets
and all roommate markets, weak unanimity and weak resource sensitivity imply mutu-
ally best. We list these results below and add a corresponding result for the subdomain
of no-odd-rings roommate markets. Furthermore, Klaus (2011, Lemma 4(b)) shows
that on the domain of solvable roommate markets, weak unanimity and resource sen-
sitivity imply mutually best. Here, we establish the new result that on the domain of
solvable roommate markets, weak unanimity, weak resource sensitivity, and consis-
tency, imply mutually best.
Lemma 4
(a) On the domain of marriage markets (Klaus 2011, Lemma 4′(a)),
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets, consistency,
(d) On the domain of all roommate markets (Klaus 2011, Lemma 4′(c))
weak unanimity and weak resource sensitivity imply mutually best.
Proof The proof of (b) is very similar to the proof of Lemma 4(a) for marriage mar-
kets because starting from a no-odd-rings market [marriage market] one can add the
newcomers in the proof such that the resulting markets are again no-odd-rings markets
[marriage markets].
Proof of (c) Let ϕ be a solution on the domain of solvable roommate markets that satis-
fies consistency, weak unanimity, and weak resource sensitivity, but not mutually best.
10 Equivalently, if agents in Nˆ are leaving: for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are newly matched at μ
at least one is worse off, i.e., if i, j ∈ N , μ′(i) = j , and μ(i) = j , then μ′(i) Pi μ(i) or μ′( j) Pj μ( j).
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Thus, there exists a solvable roommate market (N , R) and a matching μ ∈ ϕ(N , R)
such that agents i and j [possibly i = j] are mutually best and μ(i) = j . Let
N˜ = {i, j, μ(i), μ( j)} and consider the reduced market (N˜ , RN˜ ). By consistency,
μN˜ ∈ ϕ(N˜ , RN˜ ), i and j are mutually best agents, and μN˜ (i) = j .
Let N¯ = {i, j} and consider the reduced preferences R¯ = RN¯ . If i = j , then
there exists a unanimously best complete matching ν¯ for solvable roommate market
(N¯ , R¯): ν¯ matches agent i with agent j . Hence, by weak unanimity, ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯}
and ν¯(i) = j . If i = j , then ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯} and ν¯(i) = j because ν¯ is the only
possible matching. In the sequel we will not use the single-valuedness of ϕ(N¯ , R¯) but
that for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯), μ′(i) = j .
If μ(i) = i , then consider the extension (N 1, R1) of (N¯ , R¯) that is obtained by
adding newcomer μ(i) such that N 1 = N¯ ∪{μ(i)} and R1 = RN 1 .11 By weak resource
sensitivity, for all μ1 ∈ ϕ(N 1, R1), there exists μ′ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯) such that if agents i
and j (possibly i = j) are not mutually matched at μ1 anymore, then at least one is
better off. Then, since for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯) agents i and j are already mutually best
matched, for all μ1 ∈ ϕ(N 1, R1), μ1(i) = j .
If μ( j) = j , then we add newcomer μ( j) in a similar fashion. So we end up with
the reduced market (N˜ , RN˜ ). By weak resource-sensitivity, for all μ
2 ∈ ϕ(N˜ , RN˜ ),
μ2(i) = j , contradicting μN˜ (i) = j . unionsq
Lemma 4(c) cannot be established without the addition of consistency: Klaus (2011,
Example 4) provides a solution on the domain of solvable roommate markets that sat-
isfies weak unanimity and weak resource sensitivity, but neither mutually best nor
consistency.
The following result slightly generalizes Klaus (2011, Proposition 2) (the proof is
insensitive with respect to the specific domain of solvable roommate markets used).
Proposition 3 On the domain of solvable roommate markets (and on any of its subdo-
mains), any stable solution satisfies competition and resource sensitivity. In particular,
the core satisfies competition and resource sensitivity.
3.3 Previous results for marriage markets
We are aware of two papers that analyze consistency for the domain of classical
marriage markets for which matching agents of the same gender is not feasible. First,
Sasaki and Toda (1992) use the property together with Pareto optimality, anonymity,12
and converse consistency13 to characterize the core. (Özkal-Sanver, 2010, Proposi-
tion 4.2) shows that on the domain of all roommate markets, no solution satisfies Pareto
optimality, anonymity, and converse consistency. Second, Toda’s (2006) shows that
11 Note that (N 1, R1) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j , and agent μ(i) is
single.
12 Anonymity: matchings assigned by the solution do not depend on agents’ names.
13 Converse consistency: matchings assigned by the solution are (conversely) related to the matchings the
solution assigns to certain restricted roommate markets (with at most four agents).
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the core is characterized by weak unanimity, own-side population monotonicity,14 and
consistency.
Theorem 1 (Toda’s 2006, Theorem 3.2) On the domain of classical marriage mar-
kets, a solution satisfies weak unanimity, own-side population monotonicity, and con-
sistency if and only if it equals the core.
Here we focus on Toda’s characterization and analyze if and how the result extends
from (classical) marriage markets to roommate markets. Before doing so, we obtain a
new result by replacing own-side population monotonicity with other-side population
monotonicity15 in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 On the domain of classical marriage markets, a solution satisfies weak
unanimity, other-side population monotonicity, and consistency if and only if it equals
the core.
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix B.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and ?? both rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Toda’s 2006, Lemma 3.4) On the domain of classical marriage markets,
if a solution satisfies mutually best and consistency, then it is a subsolution of the core.
We show, in Sect. 4, that Lemma 5 cannot be extended to the domain of solvable
roommate markets; Example 1 in Sect. 4 shows that there exists a solution satisfying
mutually best and consistency, but which assigns unstable matchings to some solvable
roommate markets.
4 Main results
In this section we first explore some logical relations between the properties and the
core. This analysis yields “subsolution of the core” results on the domains of marriage
markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, and solvable roommate markets (parts (a),
(b), and (c) in Lemmas 6 and 7) and we establish two impossibility results on the
domain of all roommate markets (parts (d) in Lemmas 6 and 7). Second, we estab-
lish various characterizations of the core (Theorems 3 and 4). Third, we derive two
marriage market results using population monotonicity (Corollary 1).
4.1 “Subsolution of the core” and impossibility results
Lemma 6
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
14 Own-side population monotonicity: if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incumbent men
(women) are weakly worse off (for a formal definition see Appendix B). In Klaus (2011) we argue that the
proper extension of Toda’s (2006) own-side population monotonicity to roommate markets is competition
sensitivity.
15 Other-side population monotonicity: if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incumbent
women (men) are weakly better off (for a formal definition see Appendix B). In Klaus (2011) we argue that
the proper extension of other-side population monotonicity to roommate markets is resource sensitivity.
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(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
if a solution satisfies weak unanimity, competition sensitivity, and consistency,
then it is a subsolution of the core.
(d) On the domain of all roommate markets,
no solution satisfies weak unanimity, competition sensitivity, and consistency.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on any of the domains of Lemma 6 that satisfies weak una-
nimity, competition sensitivity, and consistency. By Lemma 3, ϕ is mutually best and
by Lemma 2, ϕ is individually rational.
To prove (a), (b), and (c) let (N , R) be a solvable roommate market [marriage /
no-odd-rings roommate market] such that ϕ(N , R)  core(N , R). To prove (d),
let (N , R) be an unsolvable roommate market. In all cases there exists a matching
μ ∈ ϕ(N , R) with a blocking pair {i, j} [possibly i = j] for μ. By individual ratio-
nality, i = j .
Without loss of generality assume that N \ {i, j} = {1, 2, . . . , l}. Let Nˆ =
{k1, k2, . . . , kl}  N\N be a set of newcomers and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ Nˆ ,
is an extension of (N , R) such that for all agents m ∈ N \{i, j}, m and km are mutually
best pairs and agent m is the only one that finds km acceptable and km finds only m
acceptable [if (N , R) is a marriage / no-odd-rings roommate market, then the newcom-
ers and preferences can be chosen such that (N ′, R′) is also a marriage / no-odd-rings
roommate market]. By mutually best, for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) and for all m ∈ N \{i, j},
μ′(m) = km . By competition sensitivity, for μ ∈ ϕ(N , R) there exists μˆ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′)
such that agents i and j are not mutually matched, i.e., μˆ′(i) = j (if not, then agents
i and j are newly matched at μˆ′, but both are better off). Hence, μˆ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) is the
matching that mutually best matches all agents in N ′ \ {i, j} and agents i and j are
single.
Thus, ({i, j}, R{i, j}) is a reduced market of (N ′, R′) at μˆ′ to {i, j}. Note that i and
j are mutually best agents at ({i, j}, R{i, j}) and both single at μˆ′{i, j}. By consistency,
μˆ′{i, j} ∈ ϕ({i, j}, R{i, j}), which contradicts mutually best. unionsq
In Appendix A.2 we establish a stronger version of Lemma 6(a) and (b)—
Lemma 6′—using weak competition sensitivity. Whether we can strengthen
Lemma 6(c) by using weak competition sensitivity instead of competition sensitivity
is an open problem.
With Example 2 in Appendix A.2 we illustrate why Lemmas 6 and 6′ might not
hold if the set of potential agents is finite.
Lemma 7
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
if a solution satisfies weak unanimity, resource sensitivity, and consistency, then
it is a subsolution of the core.
(d) On the domain of all roommate markets,
no solution satisfies weak unanimity, resource sensitivity, and consistency.
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Table 1 The roommate market
(Nˆ , Rˆ). 2 Pˆ1 3 Pˆ1 4 Pˆ1 1 μˆ = {(1, 3), (2, 4)}
3 Pˆ2 4 Pˆ2 1 Pˆ2 2 μˆ′ = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}
4 Pˆ3 1 Pˆ3 2 Pˆ3 3 μˆ′′ = {(1, 4), (2, 3)}
1 Pˆ4 2 Pˆ4 3 Pˆ4 4 core(Nˆ , Rˆ) = {μˆ}
Table 2 A separable submarket
of (N , R). 2 P1 3 P1 4 P1 1 P1 . . .
3 P2 4 P2 1 P2 2 P2 . . .
4 P3 1 P3 2 P3 3 P3 . . .
1 P4 2 P4 3 P4 4 P4 . . .
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on any of the domains of Lemma 7 that satisfies weak una-
nimity, resource sensitivity, and consistency. By Lemma 4, ϕ is mutually best and by
Lemma 2, ϕ is individually rational.
To prove (a), (b), and (c) let (N , R) be a solvable roommate market [marriage /
no-odd-rings roommate market] such that ϕ(N , R)  core(N , R). To prove (d), let
(N , R) be an unsolvable roommate market. In both cases there exists a matching
μ ∈ ϕ(N , R) with a blocking pair {i, j} [possibly i = j] for μ. By individual ratio-
nality, i = j .
Without loss of generality assume that N \ {i, j} = {1, 2, . . . , l} and consider the
roommate market ({i, j}, R{i, j}). There exists a unanimously best complete matching
μ¯ for (marriage, no-odd-rings, solvable) roommate market ({i, j}, R{i, j}): μ¯ matches
agent i with agent j . Hence, by weak unanimity, ϕ({i, j}, R{i, j}) = {μ¯} and μ¯(i) =
j . Consider the extension (N , R) of ({i, j}, R{i, j}) that is obtained by adding new-
comers Nˆ = {1, . . . , l}. Because μ(i) = j and μ¯(i) = j , by resource sensitivity,
μ(i) Pi μ¯(i) = j or μ( j) Pj μ¯( j) = i . This contradicts that {i, j} is a blocking pair
for μ. unionsq
In Appendix A.2 we establish a stronger version of Lemma 7(a) and (b)—Lemma 7′—
using weak resource sensitivity.
The following solution demonstrates that corresponding results to Lemmas 5 and
7′ do not exist for solvable roommate markets.
Example 1 We define solution ϕˆ on D′ ⊆ DS using the following roommate market
and matchings. Let (Nˆ , Rˆ) be such that Nˆ = {1, 2, 3, 4} and preferences Rˆ are given
in Table 1.
The unique stable matching μˆ for (Nˆ , Rˆ) matches agents 1 and 3 and agents 2 and
4. Removing any of the agents creates a “roommate cycle” for the remaining agents
and the restricted roommate market is not solvable. Thus, the solvable roommate mar-
ket (Nˆ , Rˆ) cannot be reached from another solvable roommate market by adding one
newcomer.
If (N , R) is a roommate market such that Nˆ ⊆ N and preferences R are given in
Table 2, then we say that (N , R) is a roommate market with the separable submarket
(Nˆ , Rˆ) (note that agents in Nˆ find only agents in Nˆ acceptable and any individually
rational matching will match agents in Nˆ among each others).
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We now define ϕˆ as follows. Let (N , R) be a solvable roommate market. Whenever,
(Nˆ , Rˆ) is a separable submarket of (N , R), ϕˆ first assigns all stable matchings. Fur-
thermore, for each stable matching μ (which matches all agents in Nˆ according to
the restricted matching μNˆ = μˆ), ϕˆ also assigns the two matchings μ′ and μ′′ that
correspond to μˆ′ and μˆ′′, i.e., μ′ [μ′′] matches all agents in Nˆ according to μˆ′ [μˆ′′]
and all agents in N \ Nˆ according to μ. For all other solvable roommate markets, ϕˆ
assigns the set of stable matchings. Thus, core  ϕˆ. unionsq
Proposition 4 On the domain of solvable roommate markets (and on any of its sub-
domains), solution ϕˆ (defined in Example 1) satisfies individual rationality, Pareto
optimality, (weak) unanimity, mutually best, consistency, and weak resource sensitiv-
ity.
We prove Proposition 4 in Appendix A.3.
4.2 Core characterizations
Next, we strengthen the marriage market characterizations of the core presented in
Theorem 1 (Toda’s 2006, Theorem 3.2) and Theorem 2 in two ways. First, for mar-
riage markets we replace the respective population monotonicity property with its
corresponding population sensitivity property and second, we extend this character-
ization to the domains of no-odd-rings and of solvable roommate markets.
Theorem 3 (Three Core Characterizations: Competition Sensitivity)
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
a solution satisfies weak unanimity, weak competition sensitivity, and consistency
if and only if it equals the core.
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
a solution satisfies weak unanimity, competition sensitivity, and consistency if
and only if it equals the core.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on any of the domains of Theorem 3. By Propositions 1,
2, and 3, the core satisfies weak unanimity, (weak) competition sensitivity, and con-
sistency. Let ϕ be weakly unanimous, competition sensitive, and consistent. Then, by
Lemma 6, ϕ is a subsolution of the core and by Lemma 1, ϕ equals the core. We estab-
lish (a) and (b) with weak competition sensitivity instead of competition sensitivity
by using Lemma 6′ instead of Lemma 6. unionsq
Lemma 6(d) establishes a corresponding impossibility result to Theorem 3 on the
domain of all roommate markets. Whether we can strengthen Theorem 3(c) by using
weak competition sensitivity instead of competition sensitivity is an open problem.
With Example 2 in Appendix A.2 we illustrate why Theorem 3 might not hold if
the set of potential agents is finite.
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Theorem 4 (Three Core Characterizations: Resource Sensitivity)
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
a solution satisfies weak unanimity, weak resource sensitivity, and consistency
if and only if it equals the core.
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
a solution satisfies weak unanimity, resource sensitivity, and consistency if and
only if it equals the core.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on any of the domains of Theorem 4. By Propositions 1, 2,
and 3, the core satisfies weak unanimity, (weak) resource sensitivity, and consistency.
Let ϕ be weakly unanimous, resource sensitive, and consistent. Then, by Lemma 7,
ϕ is a subsolution of the core and by Lemma 1, ϕ equals the core. We establish (a) and
(b) with weak resource sensitivity instead of resource sensitivity by using Lemma 7′
instead of Lemma 7. unionsq
Lemma 7(d) establishes a corresponding impossibility result to Theorem 4 on the
domain of all roommate markets. Solution ϕˆ (defined in Example 1) demonstrates that
Theorem 4(c) for solvable roommate markets cannot be strengthened by using weak
resource sensitivity instead of resource sensitivity.
Theorems 1 and 2 show that on the domain of classical marriage markets, the core
is the unique solution satisfying weak unanimity, consistency, and own-side or other-
side population monotonicity. Both results follow from our “population sensitivity
characterizations of the core” for marriage markets (Theorems 3(a) and 4(a)).
Corollary 1 (Two Core Characterizations for Marriage Markets)
On the domain of marriage markets, a solution satisfies weak unanimity, consistency,
and
(1) own-side population monotonicity,
(2) other-side population monotonicity,
if and only if it equals the core.
We prove Corollary 1 in Appendix B. An example constructed along the lines of
Example 2 in Appendix A.2 illustrates why Corollary 1 (1) might not hold if the set
of potential agents is finite.
We next show the independence of properties in Theorems 3 and 4 (these examples
can also be used to show the independence of properties in Corollary 1).
The solution ϕs on the domains in Theorems 3 and 4 that always assigns the match-
ing at which all agents are single satisfies (weak) competition and (weak) resource
sensitivity, consistency, but not weak unanimity.
On the domains in Theorems 3 and 4 any proper subsolution of the core satisfies
(weak) unanimity, (weak) competition and (weak) resource sensitivity (Proposition 3),
but not consistency (Lemma 1).
The Pareto solution P O on the domains in Theorems 3 and 4 satisfies (weak) una-
nimity and consistency, but neither weak competition nor weak resource sensitivity
(see Klaus 2011, Example 2).
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Remark 4 (Pareto Optimality)
Since Pareto optimality implies weak unanimity, we can use this stronger efficiency
property in all of our results (the same solutions that establish the independence of
properties in Theorems 3 and 4 can be used again). unionsq
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we make some positive contribution to the study of one-sided mar-
kets: a marriage market characterization (Toda’s 2006, Theorem 3.2) is extended to
various (solvable) roommate market domains (Theorem 3 with (weak) competition
sensitivity) and some new complementary characterizations are established (Theo-
rem 4 with (weak) resource sensitivity). Furthermore, corresponding impossibility
results (Lemmas 6(d) and 7(d)) and corresponding marriage market results (Corol-
lary 1) are obtained. At first sight, our paper thus parallels Klaus (2011) with the
difference that it extends Toda’s “consistency core characterization” (Toda’s 2006,
Theorem 3.2) instead of his “Maskin monotonicity core characterization” (Toda’s
2006, Theorem 3.1). Establishing the results mentioned above validates the new pop-
ulation sensitivity properties introduced by Klaus (2011). However, there are some
interesting and important differences between our paper and Klaus (2011) that go
beyond the use of consistency instead of Maskin monotonicity. A new feature in our
article is the addition of the no-odd-rings domain (in particular, single-peaked, sin-
gle-dipped, and distance-based preference domains constitute relevant no-odd-rings
roommate market domains). Maybe even more importantly, we had to develop a new
proof strategy to extend previous marriage market results to roommate markets. We
explain this latter aspect below.
All results in Klaus (2011) could essentially be established by following Toda’s
(2006, Theorem 3.1) proof steps.16 However, this is not true anymore when extending
Toda’s (2006, Theorem 3.2) second result. It is impossible to extend Toda’s crucial
Lemma 3.4 because one cannot show that a rule that satisfies (individual rationality,)
mutually best and consistency must be a subset of the core—see our counterexample
in Example 1. Hence, we have developed a new proof strategy for the original result
(Toda’s 2006, Theorem 3.2) that also works for the extension to roommate markets.17
An example of a result (or results) where a similar asymmetry of proof techniques
can be observed between two-sided and one-sided markets are the random paths to
stability result(s) by Roth and Van de Vate (1990) and by Diamantoudi et al. (2004).
16 Although adjusting those steps to work with the new population sensitivity properties did require a lot
of work and technical skills.
17 Two-sided markets show a lot of regularity that is missing from roommate markets: one main feature
often used in “marriage market proofs” is the polarization that occurs within the core; in particular, the exis-
tence of side-optimal stable matchings and the possibility to use side-monotonic (or side-greedy) arguments
is key in many proofs for two-sided matching markets. This polarization essentially creates the marriage
market core regularity used by Toda’s (2006) when adding or removing agents. For roommate markets (i.e.,
in our paper), the absence of polarization and regularity (not so surprisingly) causes “trouble” in that the
core basically can suddenly collapse or expand (in contrast, in marriage markets, the core lattice is only
truncated or expanded on one of its “sides”).
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We believe that the study of “one-sided (roommate) market techniques” also provides
valuable insights for more general models such as coalition formation or network
formation.
Acknowledgments B. Klaus thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for its
support under Grant VIDI-452-06-013.
Appendix A: Proofs of Lemmas 1, 6′, 7′, and Proposition 4
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Before proving Lemma 1, we state and prove a so-called Bracing Lemma (which is a
typical consistency result for many economic models, see Thomson 2009).
Lemma 8 (Bracing Lemma)
(a) Let (N , R) be a marriage market. For each μ ∈ core(N , R), there exists a
marriage market (N ′, R′) (see also Toda’s 2006, Lemma 5.8),
(b) Let (N , R) be a no-odd-rings roommate market. For each μ ∈ core(N , R),
there exists a no-odd-rings roommate market (N ′, R′),
(c) Let (N , R) be a solvable roommate market. For each μ ∈ core(N , R), there
exists a solvable roommate market (N ′, R′),
such that N ⊆ N ′, R′N = R, core(N ′, R′) = {μ′}, and μ′N = μ.
Proof For the proof of (a), let (N , R) ∈ DM , for the proof of (b), let (N , R) ∈ DN O R ,
and for the proof of (c), let (N , R) ∈ DS . If |core(N , R)| = 1, then there is nothing
to prove. Let core(N , R) = {μ,μ1, . . . , μk} for some k ≥ 1. Since the core is Pareto
optimal, there exists i∗ ∈ N such that μ(i∗) Pi∗ μ1(i∗).
First, consider the extension (N∗, R∗) of (N , R) that is obtained by adding a new-
comer n∗ ∈ N\N such that N∗ = N ∪ {n∗} and R∗ ∈ RN∗ is such that
(i) R∗N = R,
(ii) for all i ∈ N \ {i∗} and all j ∈ N (possibly i = j), j P∗i n∗,
i.e., for every agent in N—except agent i∗—agent n∗ is the least preferred
agent,
(iii) μ(i∗) P∗i∗ n∗ P∗i∗ μ1(i∗),
i.e., agent i∗ ranks the newcomer n∗ between agents μ(i∗) and μ1(i∗), and
(iv) for all j ∈ N \ {i∗}, i∗ P∗n∗ n∗ P∗n∗ j , i.e., the newcomer finds only agent i∗
acceptable.
For the proof of (a), (N∗, R∗) is a marriage market by choosing agent n∗’s gender
to be opposite of agent i∗’s gender.
For the proof of (b), we note that (N∗, R∗) is a no-odd-rings roommate market
because the newcomer n∗ cannot be part of a ring given that n∗ finds only i∗ accept-
able (by the definition of a ring, any element of a ring has at least two acceptable
agents).
For the proof of (c), we show that (N∗, R∗) is also a solvable roommate market.
Note that by construction μ ∪ {n∗} ∈ core(N∗, R∗). Thus (N∗, R∗) is solvable.
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Second, we prove that (N∗, R∗) has fewer stable matchings than (N , R). By con-
struction, μ ∪ {n∗} ∈ core(N∗, R∗). Note that by the so-called Lone Wolf Theorem
(e.g., Klaus and Klijn 2010, Theorem 1) any agent who is single in one stable matching
is single in all other stable matchings. Thus, only matchings of the form μ∗ ∪ {n∗},
μ∗ ∈ M(N , R), can be stable for roommate market (N∗, R∗). Furthermore, since the
core is consistent (Proposition 2), if for any μ˜ ∈ M(N , R), μ˜∪{n∗} ∈ core(N∗, R∗),
then μ˜ ∈ core(N , R). Hence, |core(N∗, R∗)| ≤ |core(N , R)|. Finally, since (i∗, n∗)
blocks μ1 ∪ {n∗}, μ1 ∪ {n∗} ∈ core(N∗, R∗). We conclude that |core(N∗, R∗)| <
|core(N , R)| and μ ∪ {n∗} ∈ core(N∗, R∗).
Repeating this process of adding a newcomer to reduce the number of stable match-
ings at most k times results in
(a) a marriage market (N ′, R′),
(b) a no-odd-rings roommate market (N ′, R′),
(c) a solvable roommate market (N ′, R′),
such that N ⊆ N ′, R′N = R, core(N ′, R′) = {μ′}, and μ′N = μ. unionsq
The Bracing Lemma (Lemma 8) is a key element in the proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1
(a) On the domain of marriage markets (see also Toda’s 2006, Lemma 3.6),
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
(c) On the domain of solvable roommate markets,
no proper subsolution of the core satisfies consistency.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on any of the domains D′ of Lemma 1 that is a consis-
tent subsolution of the core. Let (N , R) ∈ D′ and μ ∈ core(N , R). Then, by the
Bracing Lemma (Lemma 8), there exists a roommate market (N∗, R∗) ∈ D′ with
core(N∗, R∗) = {μ∗} such that (N , R) is a reduced market of (N∗, R∗) at μ∗ and
μ∗N = μ. Since ϕ is a subsolution of the core, ϕ(N∗, R∗) = {μ∗}. As ϕ is consis-
tent, μ ∈ ϕ(N , R). So, core(N , R) ⊆ ϕ(N , R). Since ϕ is a subsolution of the core,
ϕ(N , R) ⊆ core(N , R). Hence, ϕ(N , R) = core(N , R). unionsq
A.2 Lemmas 6′ and 7′ and their Proofs
Lemma 6′
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
if a solution satisfies weak unanimity, weak competition sensitivity, and consis-
tency, then it is a subsolution of the core.
Lemma 7′
(a) On the domain of marriage markets,
(b) On the domain of no-odd-rings roommate markets,
if a solution satisfies weak unanimity, weak resource sensitivity, and consistency
then it is a subsolution of the core.
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Because the first parts of the proofs of the above lemmas are identical, we prove
both lemmas together and indicate the steps when either weak competition sensitivity
or weak resource sensitivity are used. Throughout the proof we will list partial infor-
mation on agents’ preferences. For instance, j Ri k Ri l will be represented as Ri | j k l
in a partial preference table.
Proof Let D′ ∈ {DM ,DN O R}. Assume that ϕ satisfies weak unanimity, weak com-
petition sensitivity [weak resource sensitivity], and consistency, but that it is not a
subsolution of the core. Thus, there exists (N , R) ∈ D′ and a matching μ ∈ ϕ(N , R)
such that μ ∈ core(N , R). By Lemma 3 [Lemma 4](a) and (b), ϕ satisfies mutually
best. By Lemma 2(a) and (b), ϕ satisfies individual rationality. Hence, there exists a
blocking pair {i, j}, i = j , for μ such that j Pi μ(i) Ri i and i Pj μ( j) R j j . Let
N ′ = {i, j, μ(i), μ( j)} and consider the reduced market (N ′, RN ′) ∈ D′ of (N , R) at
μ. By consistency,
μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′). (1)
We consider three cases depending on the cardinality of N ′.
Case 1 (|N′| = 2): Consider the reduced market (N ′, RN ′) where N ′ = {i, j} (note that
(N ′, RN ′) ∈ DM ). Agents i and j are mutually best agents for (N ′, RN ′). However,
at the reduced matching μN ′ they are not mutually matched. Hence, (1) contradicts
mutually best.
Case 2 (|N′| = 3): Consider the reduced market (N ′, RN ′) where N ′ = {i, j, μ(i)}.
It is without loss of generality that we assume that agent j is single. By individual
rationality and {i, j} being a blocking pair for μ, agents’ preferences are as follows:
Ri j μ(i) i
Rμ(i) i μ(i)
R j i j
Weak Competition Sensitivity Step (Lemma 6′). Assume that (Nˆ ′, Rˆ′), Nˆ ′ = N ′ ∪ {n},
is an extension of (N ′, RN ′) such that agents μ(i) and n are mutually best agents for
(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′) and agent μ(i) is the only one that finds n acceptable and n finds only μ(i)
acceptable [the newcomer and preferences can be chosen such that (Nˆ ′, RNˆ ′) is also a
marriage / no-odd-rings roommate market]. By mutually best, for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′),
μ′(n) = μ(i). By weak competition sensitivity, for μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′) there exists
μˆ′ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′) such that agents i and j are not mutually matched, i.e., μˆ′(i) = j
(if not, then agents i and j are newly matched at μˆ′, but both are better off). Hence,
μˆ′ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′) is the matching that mutually best matches agents μ(i) and n and
agents i and j are single.
Thus, ({i, j}, R{i, j}) is a reduced market of (Nˆ ′, Rˆ′) at μˆ′ to {i, j}. Note that i and
j are mutually best agents at ({i, j}, R{i, j}) and both single at μˆ′{i, j}. By consistency,
μˆ′{i, j} ∈ ϕ({i, j}, R{i, j}), which contradicts mutually best.
Weak Resource Sensitivity Step (Lemma 7′). Consider the roommate market ({i, j},
R{i, j}). There exists a unanimously best complete matching μ¯ for (marriage,
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no-odd-rings) roommate market ({i, j}, R{i, j}): μ¯ matches agent i with agent j . Hence,
by weak unanimity, ϕ({i, j}, R{i, j}) = {μ¯} and μ¯(i) = j .
Consider the extension (N ′, RN ′) of ({i, j}, R{i, j}) that is obtained by adding new-
comer μ(i). Because μ(i) = j and μ¯(i) = j , by weak resource sensitivity, μ(i) Pi
μ¯(i) = j or μ( j) Pj μ¯( j) = i . This contradicts that {i, j} is a blocking pair for μ.
Case 3 (|N′| = 4): Consider the reduced market (N ′, RN ′) where N ′ = {i, j, μ(i),
μ( j)}. By individual rationality and {i, j} being a blocking pair for μ, agents’ prefer-
ences are as follows:
Ri j μ(i) i
R j i μ( j) j
Rμ(i) i μ(i)
Rμ( j) j μ( j)
If agents i and j are mutually best agents for (N ′, RN ′), then (1) contradicts mutually
best. If (N ′, RN ′) is a marriage market, then agents j and μ(i) and agents i and μ( j)
have the same gender. But then, agents i and j are mutually best agents for (N ′, RN ′)
that are not mutually matched at μN ′ ; a contradiction. Hence, D′ = DN O R and agents
i and j not being mutually best agents for (N ′, RN ′) implies μ( j) Pi j Pi μ(i) Pi i or
μ(i) Pj i Pj μ( j) Pj j . Without loss of generality we assume that μ(i) Pj i Pj μ( j) Pj j .
Thus, agents’ preferences can be further restricted to:
Ri j μ(i) i
R j μ(i) i μ( j) j
Rμ(i) i μ(i)
Rμ( j) j μ( j)
Weak Competition Sensitivity Step (Lemma 6′). Assume that (Nˆ ′, Rˆ′), Nˆ ′ = N ′ ∪ {n},
is an extension of (N ′, RN ′) such that agents μ( j) and n are mutually best agents for
(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′) and agent μ( j) is the only one that finds n acceptable and n finds only μ( j)
acceptable [the newcomer and preferences can be chosen such that (N ′, RN ′) is a no-
odd-rings roommate market]. By mutually best, for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′), μ′(n) = μ( j).
By weak competition sensitivity, for μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′) there exists μˆ′ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ ′, Rˆ′)
such that agents i and j are not mutually matched, i.e., μˆ′(i) = j (if not, then agents
i and j are newly matched at μˆ′, but both are better off).
(*) If j Pμ(i) i Pμ(i) μ(i) and μˆ′( j) = μ(i), then agents j and μ(i) are newly matched
and both better off; contradicting the choice of μˆ′ to satisfy weak competition sensi-
tivity.
Consider the reduced market ({i, j, μ(i)}, R{i, j,μ(i)}) ∈ DN O R of (Nˆ ′, Rˆ′) at μˆ′.
Ri j μ(i) i
R j μ(i) i j
Rμ(i) i μ(i)
By weak competition sensitivity and consistency, μ¯′ ≡ μˆ′{i, j,μ(i)} ∈ ϕ({i, j, μ(i)},
R{i, j,μ(i)}) such that μ¯′(i) = j.
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We continue with the joint proof of Lemmas 6′ and 7′ after establishing a corre-
sponding proof step for weak resource sensitivity.
Weak Resource Sensitivity Step (Lemma 7′). Consider the reduced market
({i, j, μ(i)}, R{i, j,μ(i)}) ∈ DN O R obtained from agent μ( j) leaving (N ′, RN ′).
Ri j μ(i) i
R j μ(i) i j
Rμ(i) i μ(i)
By weak resource sensitivity, for μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′) there exists μ¯′ ∈ ϕ({i, j, μ(i)},
R{i, j,μ(i)}) such that agents i and j are not mutually matched, i.e., μ¯′(i) = j (if not,
then agents i and j are not mutually matched at μN ′ anymore, but both are worse off).
(*) If j Pμ(i) i Pμ(i) μ(i) and μˆ′( j) = μ(i), then agents j and μ(i) are not mutually
matched at μN ′ anymore and both are worse off; contradicting the choice of μˆ′ to
satisfy weak resource sensitivity.
We now finish the proof of Lemmas 6′ and 7′ with a joint step. In the previous steps
we have established the existence of
μ¯′ ∈ ϕ({i, j, μ(i)}, R{i, j,μ(i)}) such that μ¯′(i) = j.
If μ¯′(i) = μ(i), then {i, j} is a blocking pair for μ¯′. If μ¯′(i) = i and μ¯′( j) = j ,
then {i, j} is a blocking pair for μ¯′. The remaining case to discuss is μ¯′(i) = i
and μ¯′( j) = μ(i). If i Pμ(i) j Pμ(i) μ(i), then {i, j, μ(i)} constitutes an odd ring;
contradicting ({i, j, μ(i)}, R{i, j,μ(i)}) ∈ DN O R . By (*), j Pμ(i) i Pμ(i) μ(i) is not pos-
sible. Hence, i Pμ(i) μ(i) Pμ(i) j and μ¯′( j) = μ(i). However, μ¯′( j) = μ(i) violates
individual rationality, a contradiction.
To summarize, we either obtain a contradiction, or blocking pair {i, j} for μ¯′ ∈
ϕ({i, j, μ(i)}, R{i, j,μ(i)}). Since |{i, j, μ¯′(i), μ¯′( j)}| ≤ 3, Cases 1 and 2 now imply a
contradiction. unionsq
The following three-agent example demonstrates why Lemmas 3, 6, 6′, and Theo-
rem 3 might not hold if the set of potential agents is finite. Note that the simple idea of
Example 2 (namely to add a non-core matching to all roommate markets containing
the finite set of potential agents) can be extended to any finite set of potential agents
(if the set of potential agents is even, then one should only add the additional matching
for roommate markets without a unanimously best complete matching).
Example 2 Assume that the set of potential agents is {1, 2, 3} and denote by μ12
the matching where agents 1 and 2 are matched. Then, for all roommate markets
(N , R) ∈ D′ ⊆ DS ,
ϕ˜(N , R) =
{
core(N , R) ∪ {μ12} if |N | = 3 and μ12 ∈ I R(N , R),
core(N , R) otherwise.
It is easy to check that ϕ˜ satisfies weak unanimity, (weak) competition sensitivity, and
consistency, but it is not a subsolution of the core. unionsq
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A. 3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 On the domain of solvable roommate markets (and on any of its sub-
domains), solution ϕˆ (defined in Example 1) satisfies individual rationality, Pareto
optimality, (weak) unanimity, mutually best, consistency, and weak resource sensitiv-
ity.
Proof We prove Proposition 4 for D′ = DS . It is easy to see that solution ϕˆ (defined
in Example 1) satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality, (weak) unanimity, and
mutually best.
We partition the domain of solvable roommate markets DS into the subdomain
DSS of solvable roommate markets with the separable submarket (Nˆ , Rˆ) and its
complement solvable domain DC S = DS \ DSS (without separable submarket
(Nˆ , Rˆ)).
Note that for roommate markets with a separable submarket (DSS), the set of agents
Nˆ constitutes an even ring of size 4. Hence removing an agent from this submarket
dissolves the solvability of the market due to an odd ring at the top of preferences of
3 agents in Nˆ . Therefore, it is not possible to obtain an extension (N ′, R′) ∈ DSS of
(N , R) ∈ DC S by adding a newcomer n ∈ N\N . Furthermore, since each agent in Nˆ
finds only agents in Nˆ acceptable, for all extensions (N ′, R′) ∈ DS of (N , R) ∈ DSS
that are obtained by adding a newcomer n ∈ N\N , and for all μ′ ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′),
μ′(Nˆ ) = Nˆ .
Weak Resource Sensitivity. In order to show that ϕˆ is weakly resource sensitive, let
(N , R) ∈ DS and consider the extension (N ′, R′) ∈ DS of (N , R) obtained by adding
a newcomer n ∈ N\N .
Case 1. Let (N , R) ∈ DC S . It follows that (N ′, R′) ∈ DC S . By construction of ϕˆ,
ϕˆ(N , R) = core(N , R) and ϕˆ(N ′, R′) = core(N ′, R′). By Proposition 3, the core is
weakly resource sensitive. Hence, for all μ′ ∈ core(N ′, R′) = ϕˆ(N ′, R′) there exists
μ ∈ core(N , R) = ϕˆ(N , R) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are not
mutually matched at μ′ anymore, at least one is better off.
Case 2. Let (N , R) ∈ DSS and assume (N ′, R′) ∈ DC S . By construction of ϕˆ,
ϕˆ(N , R)  core(N , R) and ϕˆ(N ′, R′) = core(N ′, R′). By Proposition 3, the core is
weakly resource sensitive. Hence, for all μ′ ∈ core(N ′, R′) = ϕˆ(N ′, R′) there exists
μ ∈ core(N , R)  ϕˆ(N , R) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are not
mutually matched at μ′ anymore, at least one is better off.
Case 3. Let (N , R) ∈ DSS and assume (N ′, R′) ∈ DSS . Since each agent in Nˆ
finds only agents in Nˆ acceptable, for all μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R), μ(Nˆ ) = Nˆ , and for all
μ′ ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′), μ′(Nˆ ) = Nˆ . Therefore, we treat the set of agents Nˆ separately from
the set of agents N \ Nˆ .
For agents in Nˆ : Note that in both roommate markets (N , R) and (N ′, R′), ϕˆ matches
agents in Nˆ according to μˆ, μˆ′, or μˆ′′. Therefore, for all μ′ ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′) there exists
μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R) such that μ′
Nˆ
= μNˆ ∈ {μˆ, μˆ′, μˆ′′}. In particular, μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R) is such
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that for all i, j ∈ Nˆ [possibly i = j] that are not mutually matched at μ′ anymore, at
least one is better off.
For agents in N \ Nˆ : Note that in both roommate markets (N , R) and (N ′, R′), ϕˆ
matches agents in N \ Nˆ (respectively N ′ \ Nˆ ) according to ϕˆ(N \ Nˆ , RN\Nˆ ) =
core(N \ Nˆ , RN\Nˆ ) (respectively ϕˆ(N ′ \ Nˆ , RN ′\Nˆ ) = core(N ′ \ Nˆ , RN ′\Nˆ )). By
Proposition 3, the core is weakly resource sensitive. Hence, for all μ′ ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′),
μ′
N ′\Nˆ ∈ core(N ′ \ Nˆ , RN ′\Nˆ ) and there exists μN\Nˆ ∈ core(N \ Nˆ , RN\Nˆ ) such that
for all i, j ∈ N \ Nˆ [possibly i = j] that are not mutually matched at μ′
N ′\Nˆ with each
other anymore, at least one is better off. In particular, we can choose μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R)
such that μ′
Nˆ
= μNˆ .
Cases 1–3 imply that for all (N , R), (N ′, R′) ∈ DS such that (N ′, R′) is an exten-
sion of (N , R) obtained by adding a newcomer n ∈ N\N and for all μ′ ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′)
there exists μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are not
mutually matched at μ′ anymore, at least one is better off.
Consistency. In order to show that ϕˆ is consistent, let (N , R) ∈ DS , μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R),
and assume that (N ′, RN ′) ∈ DS is a reduced market of (N , R) at μ to N ′.18
Case 1. Let (N , R) ∈ DC S . By construction of ϕˆ, ϕˆ(N , R) = core(N , R) and
core(N ′, R′) ⊆ ϕˆ(N ′, R′). By Proposition 2, the core is consistent. Hence, for all
μ ∈ core(N , R) = ϕˆ(N , R), μN ′ ∈ core(N ′, R′) ⊆ ϕˆ(N , R).
Case 2. Let (N , R) ∈ DSS . By construction of ϕˆ, μ = (μ∗, μ˜) for some μ∗ = μN\Nˆ ∈
core(N \ Nˆ , RN\Nˆ ) and for some μ˜ = μNˆ ∈ {μˆ, μˆ′, μˆ′′}.
Case 2.1. Let (N ′, R′) ∈ DSS . Thus, Nˆ ⊆ N ′ and μN ′ = (μ∗N ′\Nˆ , μ˜). By Prop-
osition 2, the core is consistent. Hence, μ∗
N ′\Nˆ ∈ core(N ′ \ Nˆ , RN ′\Nˆ ). Thus, by
construction of ϕˆ, μN ′ = (μ∗N ′\Nˆ , μ˜) ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′).
Case 2.2. Let (N ′, R′) ∈ DC S . By construction of ϕˆ, ϕˆ(N ′, R′) = core(N ′, R′). By
Proposition 2, the core is consistent. Hence, since μ∗ ∈ core(N \ Nˆ , RN\Nˆ ), μ∗N ′\Nˆ ∈
core(N ′ \ Nˆ , RN ′\Nˆ ). Since (N ′, R′) ∈ DC S , either Nˆ ∩ N ′ = ∅ or |Nˆ ∩ N ′| = 2. If
Nˆ ∩ N ′ = ∅, then N ′ \ Nˆ = N ′, which implies μN ′ = μ∗N ′\Nˆ ∈ core(N ′, R′) =
ϕˆ(N ′, R′). Assume that |Nˆ ∩ N ′| = 2 and Nˆ ∩ N ′ = {i, j}. Since the reduced market
(N ′, R′) is obtained from (N , R) ∈ DSS , μ˜(i) = j . Furthermore, agents i and j are
mutually best agents for (N ′, R′). Hence, for all μ′ ∈ ϕˆ(N ′, R′) = core(N ′, R′),
μ′(i) = j . Thus, by construction of ϕˆ, μN ′ = (μ∗N ′\Nˆ , μ˜{i, j}) ∈ core(N ′, R′) =
ϕˆ(N ′, R′). unionsq
18 Note that solvability is closed under reduction for ϕˆ, i.e., for all (N , R) ∈ DS and for all matchings
μ ∈ ϕˆ(N , R), the reduced market (N ′, R′) of (N , R) at μ is also solvable.
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Appendix B: Consistency and population monotonicity for (classical) marriage
markets
A classical marriage market (Gale and Shapley 1962) (N , R) is such that N is the union
of two disjoint sets M and W and each agent in M (respectively W ) has restricted
preferences over being matched to agents in the set W (respectively M) and being
single (instead of having preferences over N ). Furthermore, matching agents of the
same gender is not feasible (instead of matching agents of the same gender being
individually irrational). Definitions and results labeled “on the domain of (classical)
marriage markets” in this appendix apply to the classical marriage market domain as
well as to our “marriage-roommate market” domain. We first introduce two population
monotonicity properties.
Own-side population monotonicity (simply called population monotonicity by
Toda’s 2006) states that if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incum-
bent men (women) are weakly worse off. We formalize a somewhat weaker version of
own-side population monotonicity by restricting population changes to one newcomer
at a time (this “weak own-side population monotonicity” implies the original own-side
population monotonicity by adding men (women) one by one).
Own-Side Population Monotonicity for Marriage Markets: A solution ϕ on the
domain of (classical) marriage markets is own-side population monotonic if the follow-
ing holds. Let (N , R) be a marriage market and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ {n},
is an extension of (N , R) and the newcomer n is a man [woman]. Then, for all μ ∈
ϕ(N , R) there exists μ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) such that for all men m ∈ N , μ(m) Rm μ′(m)
[for all women w ∈ N , μ(w) Rw μ′(w)].
Other-side population monotonicity states that if additional men (women) enter the
market, then all incumbent women (men) are weakly better off. We formalize a some-
what weaker version of other-side population monotonicity by restricting population
changes to one newcomer at a time (this “weak other-side population monotonicity”
implies the original other-side population monotonicity by adding men (women) one
by one).
Other-Side Population Monotonicity for Marriage Markets: A solution ϕ on the
domain of (classical) marriage markets is other-side population monotonic if the fol-
lowing holds. Let (N , R) be a marriage market and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N∪{n},
is an extension of (N , R) and the newcomer n is a man [woman]. Then, for all μ′ ∈
ϕ(N ′, R′) there exists μ ∈ ϕ(N , R) such that for all women w ∈ N , μ′(w) Rw μ(w)
[for all men m ∈ N , μ′(m) Rm μ(m)].
Proposition 5 On the domain of (classical) marriage markets, the core satisfies own-
side and other-side population monotonicity.
Proof By Toda’s (2006, Proposition 2.1) the core satisfies own-side population mono-
tonicity for the domain of classical marriage markets. However, we show both prop-
erties in a symmetric way using results by Crawford (1991). Note that the classical
marriage market results used in this proof also hold for “marriage-roommate” markets
(see Remark 1).
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Let (N , R), (N ′, R′) be such that (N ′, R′) is an extension of (N , R) with
N ′ = N ∪ {n}, without loss of generality newcomer n being a man. We denote
the men-optimal stable matching and the women-optimal stable matching (Gale and
Shapley 1962) by μM , μW for roommate market (N , R) and μ′M , μ′W for roommate
market (N ′, R′).
By Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Corollary 2.14), for all μ ∈ core(N , R) and all men
m ∈ N , μ Rm μW . By Crawford (1991, Theorem 1), for all men m ∈ N , μW Rm μ′W .
Hence for all μ ∈ core(N , R), there exists μ′ ∈ core(N ′, R′), namely μ′ ≡ μ′W , such
that for all men m ∈ N , μ Rm μ′. This implies own-side population monotonicity.
By Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Corollary 2.14), for all μ′ ∈ core(N ′, R′) and all
women w ∈ N , μ′ Rw μ′M . By Crawford (1991, Theorem 2), for all women w ∈ N ,
μ′M Rw μM . Hence for all μ′ ∈ core(N ′, R′), there exists μ ∈ core(N , R), namely
μ ≡ μM , such that for all women w ∈ N , μ′ Rw μ. This implies other-side population
monotonicity. unionsq
We next establish some relations between properties for marriage markets.
Lemma 9 On the domain of (classical) marriage markets, other-side population
monotonicity, and consistency imply individual rationality.
Proof Assume that ϕ satisfies weak unanimity and consistency, but not individual
rationality. Then, there exists a marriage market (N , R), a matching μ ∈ ϕ(N , R),
and without loss of generality a man m ∈ N , such that m Pm μ(m) (alternatively we
could assume that there exists a woman w ∈ N such that w Pw μ(w)).
Let N ′ = {m, μ(m)}. Then, marriage market (N ′, RN ′) is a reduced market of
(N , R) at μ and by consistency, μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′) and μN ′(m) = μ(m).
Let N¯ = {m}. Marriage market (N¯ , RN¯ ) is a one agent market with only one possi-
ble matching. Hence, ϕ(N¯ , RN¯ ) = {μ¯} with μ¯(m) = m. Furthermore, (N ′, R′) is an
extension of (N¯ , RN¯ ) and the newcomer μ(m) is a woman. Thus, by other-side pop-
ulation monotonicity, for all μ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′), μ′(m) Rm μ¯(m) = m. This contradicts
μN ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, RN ′) and m Pm μN ′(m). unionsq
Klaus (2011) shows that on the domain of marriage markets, weak resource sensitiv-
ity is essentially a weaker property than other-side population monotonicity (individual
rationality is added to ensure that no two agents of the same gender are matched, see
Remark 1).
Lemma 10 (Klaus 2011, Lemma 2) On the domain of (classical) marriage markets,
individual rationality and other-side population monotonicity imply weak resource
sensitivity.
Strictly speaking Klaus (2011) does not give the proof for classical marriage mar-
kets, but the proof of Lemma 10 is essentially the same as Klaus (2011, Lemma 2).
The following two lemmas by Toda’s (2006) are used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5 (Toda’s 2006, Lemma 3.4). On the domain of classical marriage markets,
if a solution ϕ satisfies individual rationality, mutually best, and consistency, then it
is a subsolution of the core.
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Lemma 11 (Toda’s 2006, Lemma 3.6) On the domain of classical marriage markets,
no proper subsolution of the core satisfies consistency.
Next, we restate and prove Theorem ??.
Theorem 2 On the domain of classical marriage markets, a solution satisfies weak
unanimity, other-side population monotonicity, and consistency if and only if it equals
the core.
Proof The core satisfies weak unanimity and consistency Toda’s (2006). By Proposi-
tion 5, the core is other-side population monotonic.
Let ϕ satisfy weak unanimity, other-side population monotonicity, and consistency.
Then, by Lemma 9, ϕ is individually rational. Thus, by Lemma 10, ϕ satisfies weak
resource sensitivity. Hence, by Lemma 4(a) (the proof essentially remains the same
on the domain of classical marriage markets), ϕ satisfies mutually best. Thus, by
Lemma 5, ϕ is a subsolution of the core. Then, Lemma 11 implies that ϕ equals the
core. unionsq
We conclude this appendix by restating and proving Corollary 1. For completeness,
we first state the following lemma.
Lemma 12 (Klaus 2011, Lemma 1) On the domain of marriage markets, individual
rationality and own-side population monotonicity imply weak competition sensitivity.
Corollary 1 (Two Characterizations of the Core for Marriage Markets)
On the domain of marriage markets, a solution satisfies weak unanimity, consistency,
and
(1) own-side population monotonicity;
(2) other-side population monotonicity;
if and only if it equals the core.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution on the domain of marriage markets. Let ϕ be weakly unani-
mous, consistent, and (1) own-side population monotonic or (2) other-side population
monotonic. By Lemma 9, ϕ is individually rational. Thus, (1) by Lemma 12, ϕ is
weakly competition sensitive and (2) by Lemma 10, ϕ is weakly resource sensitive.
Hence, (1) by Theorem 3(a), ϕ equals the core and (2) by Theorem 4(a), ϕ equals the
core. unionsq
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